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ABSTRACT

This Article examines the three most prominent uses of the
term "object and purpose" within the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and, in each instance, offers a new method for
applying the term. First, the rule that a treaty be interpreted "in
light of" its object and purpose requires a process of
interpretation that oscillates between a treaty's individual
provisions and the logic of all its provisions as a whole. Second,
for reservations, the term exists to preserve "rule coherence[,]"as
that term has been developed by Professor Thomas Franck.
Lastly, states are required upon signature not to "defeat" the
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object and purpose of a treaty, and this rule is best understood
as a means of facilitating domestic legislative review of new
treaties by preserving the status quo at the time of signature. In
sum, this Article examines a term of art that has perplexed
scholars and practitioners for decades, and, in three specific
contexts, it offers an understandingof the term refined beyond
what other writers have offered.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The phrase "object and purpose" is used relatively frequently in
the law of treaties, and the phrase's meaning could be decisive in
resolving multiple current international law controversies. Yet,
object and purpose is a term of art without a workable definition.
Broadly speaking, it refers to a treaty's essential goals, as if a treaty's
text could be boiled down to a concentrated broth-the essence of a
treaty.' Beyond this general idea, scholars have failed to create a
definition with adequate clarity and detail to serve lawyers who must
apply the term in practice. Those who have attempted to do so admit
"with regret" that it remains an "enigma" that, "[i]nstead of reducing
the potential of future conflicts . . . [,] plants the seed of them."2

The ambiguity of the term object and purpose creates problems
in a range of current international law contexts. For example, the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) governs and affirms women's fundamental
right to equal treatment,3 but some states party attempted to attach
broad reservations that would have eviscerated CEDAW's
protections. 4 The conflict over whether such reservations were
permitted hinged on whether they were "incompatible" with
CEDAW's object and purpose. 5
Another example of a current object and purpose issue involves
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). 6 The United

1.

Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The "Object and Purpose" of a Treaty: An

Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIA REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 311, 343 (1998) (suggesting that a treaty's
object and purpose are the sum of the treaty's essential elements separated from the
unessential ones).
Id.
2.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
3.
Women, Dec.18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
Infra Part IV.B.4 (providing a more detailed discussion of these
4.
reservations); see also William A. Schabas, Reservations to the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 79, 82-89 (1997) (stating that thirtynine states that were party to the Women's Convention made reservations to its
substantive provisions and describing the reservations).
Infra Part IV.B.4. For another -example of how object and purpose
5.
complicates treaty making in the context of reservations, see the insightful discussion

in Carlos M. VAzquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the
JudicialEnforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 677-80 (2008).
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439;
6.

see also David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal
Status in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U.
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States signed the CTBT in 1996 but has not yet ratified it. 7
Signature alone does not bind the United States to all provisions of
the treaty, but signature nevertheless triggers an obligation not to
defeat the treaty's object and purpose. 8 Regrettably, there is no
conclusive understanding of the extent of this obligation. One may
reasonably believe, for example, that the United States government
may conduct one nuclear test-or ten-without defeating the treaty's
object and purpose, leaving the CTBT in a state of "legal limbo."9
A third example involves the United States' relationship to the
International Criminal Court (ICC).' 0 The ICC is the international
tribunal established to prosecute war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity." From December 2000 to May 2002, the United
States was a signatory to the Rome Statute, the treaty establishing
the ICC, but did not ratify it.12 Then, in May 2002, President Bush
authorized the "unsigning" of the treaty. 13 During the interim
J. INT'L L. & POL. 1007, 1031 (2007) (outlining the Author's interpretations regarding
the CTBT and the obligations imposed under Article 18, Vienna Convention).
7.
Jonas, supra note 6, at 1019, 1029.
8.
See Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when . . . it has signed the treaty or has exchanged
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to
the treaty ....

Id.
9.
Jonas, supra note 6, at 1029. "[T]he CTBT has been rejected by the Senate
and there are no immediate plans for Senate reconsideration. Meanwhile, the United
States continues its unilaterally-imposed nuclear testing moratorium." Id. at 1029-30.

10.
See generally Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify
International Criminal Court Treaty, AM. Soc'Y. INT'L L. INSIGHTS, May 2002,
http://www.asil.org/insigh87.cfm#_edn4 ("On May 6, 2002, the Bush Administration
announced that the United States does not intend to become a party to the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court."). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
signaled a potential willingness of the Obama administration to re-sign the Rome
Statute when she recently said, "This is a great regret that we are not a signatory."

Ewan MacAskill, US May Join International War Crimes Court, Clinton Hints:
Secretary of State Regrets Failure to Sign Up: Obama Advisors Still Urge Caution After
Bush Ban, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 7, 2009, at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevertheless, U.S. ratification appears unlikely. See John B. Bellinger, Editorial, A
Global Court Quandary for the President, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2009 at A13
("Although the Obama administration will undoubtedly make greater efforts to engage
with the court, the United States is unlikely to join the ICC anytime soon.").
11.
Bellinger, supra note 10, at A13.
12.
Bradley, supra note 10.
13.
Id.; Jonas, supra note 6, at 1043. "Unsigning" is not a legal term; no
attempt was made to physically remove the United States' signature, and the Bush
Administration did not use the term unsigning when it announced its intention not to
become a member of the Rome Statute. Id. Rather, the term was applied only later by
commentators. Id.
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between signature and unsigning, the United States was bound not to
"defeat the object and purpose" of the Rome Statute. 14 Yet, the extent
of this obligation was (and remains) undefined. Signature might
have created an obligation to cooperate with the ICC, including
surrendering suspects on U.S. territory to the ICC. 15 Signature
might have also waived certain objections to the ICC's jurisdiction to
prosecute U.S. citizens. 16 The Bush Administration took the
unprecedented step of unsigning the treaty because of these vague
and potentially significant obligations.1 7 By unsigning, the United
States demonstrated that it no longer desired to become a party to
the treaty, and thus the obligation not to defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty no longer applied.1 8
Leaving such a vital term undefined risks undermining the
strength and legitimacy of international law. Scholars debate why
states comply with their international law obligations despite the
lack of strong enforcement mechanisms, and one of the critical factors
recognized by multiple theories is whether the law is clear.'9 Vague
terms such as object and purpose erode the law's capacity to guide
state behavior. This erosion is especially worrisome for the term
object and purpose because it is used so frequently within the
international legal regime. 20 It is used eight times in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) alone. 21 It is

14.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 18.
15.
Bradley, supra note 10.
Id.
16.
17.
Id.
18.
See BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 102 (5th ed. 2007) ("The
United States . . . signified that since it no longer intended to become a party. . . it was
not obligated under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention 'to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose."').
19.
Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary InternationalLaw, 27 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 115, 124-28 (2005) (discussing traditional attacks on Customary International
Law). Guzman argues that states obey international law based on the consequences
that will result from compliance or noncompliance. Id. at 131-39. Indeterminate laws
are less likely to be obeyed, because they are less likely to trigger negative effects when
violated. Id. For the paradigmatic example of a legitimacy-based theory, see THOMAS
FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990). Franck argues that the
key to understanding when a law is obeyed is the law's legitimacy, and a primary
factor affecting whether a law is perceived as legitimate is whether the law is clear. Id.
at 52 ("The preeminent literary property affecting legitimacy is the rule text's
determinacy: that which makes its message clear."). For a realist example, see Anthony
D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L.R. 1110,
1129 (1982). For a transnational legal process model, see Claire R. Kelly, Enmeshment
as a Theory of Compliance, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 303, 305-09 (2005).
20.
See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31.1 (providing for a treaty
to be interpreted in accordance with its "object and purpose").
21.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, passim.
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discussed in multiple decisions of the International Court of Justice, 22
as well as other domestic2 3 and transnational courts.24 The term is
also used in numerous treaties.2 5 In light of the term's prevalence,
importance, and enduring ambiguity, this Article offers a better
understanding of object and purpose as those words are used in the
Vienna Convention.
Part II of this Article surveys all eight invocations of object and
purpose within the Vienna Convention to provide the reader with a
broad overview. Each of the subsequent three parts focuses on a
specific invocation of the term, offering a new understanding of object
and purpose refined beyond what has been offered by other writers.
22.
See, e.g., LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 21) ("The
Court will therefore now consider the object and purpose of the Statute together with
the context of Article 41."); Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment
of Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28) (discussing the object
and purpose of the Genocide Convention).
See, e.g., Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006).
23.
Article 36 . . . governs relations between a consulate and its nationals,
particularly those who have been arrested by the host country. Its object is to
assure consular communication and assistance to such nationals, who may not
fully understand the host country's legal regime or even speak its language.
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship & Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982,
para. 57 ("This overarching and clear human rights object and purpose is the
background against which interpretation of individual provisions must take place.");
Leung Kwok Hung v. H.K. Special Admin. Region, [2005] 3 H.K.C.F.A.R. 164, 181
(C.F.A.) (noting the object and purpose of the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
24.
See, e.g., Plattform "Arzte fur das Leben" v. Austria, App. No. 10126/82, 13
Eur. H.R. Rep. 204, para. 32 (1988) ("Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly
cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a
purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of
Article 11.").
25.
See, e.g., Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support
and Other Forms of Family Maintenance art. 51(2), concluded Nov. 23, 2007, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 110-21 ("Any Contracting State may conclude with one or more
Contracting States agreements, which contain provisions on matters governed by the
Convention, . . . provided that such agreements are consistent with the objects and
purpose of the Convention. . . ."); Agreement on Extradition Between the European
Union and the United States of America art. 1, U.S.-Eur. Union, June 25, 2003, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 109-14 (stating the Agreement's object and purpose is "to provide for
enhancements to cooperation and mutual legal assistance."); Inter-American
Convention Against Terrorism art. 1, June 3, 2002, S. TREATY Doc. No. 107-18 ("The
purposes of this Convention are to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorism. To that
end, the states parties agree to adopt the necessary measures and to strengthen
cooperation among them, in accordance with the terms of this Convention.");
Agreement on Mutual Acceptance of Oenological Practices art. 6, ST. DEP'T. No. 03-10,
Dec. 18, 2001, availableat http://www.trade.gov/td/ocg/eng-agreement.htm ('Technical
regulations and standards relating to labeling shall . .. not be used as a mechanism to
frustrate the object and purpose of this Agreement."); CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 28(2)
("A reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the present Convention
shall not be permitted.").
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Part III examines Article 31 and the rule that treaties must be
interpreted in light of their object and purpose. Article 31 calls for a
dialectical interpretive process, oscillating between the specific
provisions of a treaty and the general normative logic of the treaty
taken as a whole. 26
Part IV examines Article 19(c), which prohibits reservations that
are incompatible with a treaty's object and purpose. In this context,
the object and purpose test is a coherence-preserving device, meaning
it exists to ensure that reservations do not add new distinctions to a
treaty's rules unless those distinctions can be justified within the
existing logic of the treaty.27
Finally, Part V examines Article 18, which forbids signatories
from defeating a treaty's object and purpose prior to ratification. 28
Article 18 is best understood as a rule to facilitate domestic
legislative review of new treaties during the time between signature
and ratification. To achieve this end, Part V suggests a new
"facilitation test" that aligns states' expectations and tempers
gamesmanship among signatories.
Central to the structure of this Article is the belief that object
and purpose is a necessarily abstract concept. Broadly, object and
purpose refers to a treaty's goals, but any attempt to create a more
specific definition risks truncating the full importance of the term.
Necessarily abstract concepts are found in other contexts as well; in
American constitutional law, for example, the terms "necessary and
proper" and "equal protection" are vague yet clearly vital.2 9 No single
definition of these terms can be both broad enough to capture their
full meaning and specific enough to guide practitioners in particular
cases. To understand such terms, a more productive strategy-the
strategy used in this Article-is to study how the term should be
applied in particular contexts.

II. EIGHT USES OF THE TERM OBJECT AND PURPOSE
WITHIN THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES
The 1969 Vienna Convention "codified the law of treaties." 30 It

was drafted by the International Law Commission in the late 1960s

26.
27.
28.
29.

Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31.
Id. art. 19(c).
Id. art. 18.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

30.
ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (2005); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. III, at

145 (1987) ("This Restatement accepts the Vienna

Convention as, in general,
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and entered into force January 27, 1980.31 Over one hundred states
have joined the Convention and are thereby bound by it.3 2 Even
states that have not joined are bound insofar as many of the
Convention's articles reflect customary international law. 33 When
the U.S. Department of State submitted the Vienna Convention to the
President, the accompanying letter noted that "[a]lthough not yet in
force, the Convention is already generally recognized as the
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." 34
Furthermore, "[t]he Department of State has on various occasions
stated that it regards particular articles of the Convention as
codifying existing international law[, and] United States courts have
also treated particular provisions of the Vienna Convention as
authoritative."

@

The term object and purpose is used eight times in the Vienna
Convention. All eight examples are considered below:
Article 18: When a state signs a treaty but before the treaty
enters into force, the state is "obliged to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty."36
Scholars and practitioners deem this an "interim obligation"
because it exists in the interim between signature (prior to which a
state is not bound by any aspect of the treaty) and ratification (after
which a state is completely bound to observe all terms of the treaty).37
The extent of the interim obligation has never been conclusively

constituting a codification of the customary international law governing international
agreements.").
31.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 579-80 (6th ed.
2003).
32.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status of
Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetailslll.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg-no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3
&1ang-en (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
33.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 580 n.6 (listing instances where the
International Court of Justice has treated the Vienna Convention as adopting
customary international law).
34.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
pt. III, at 145 (quoting S. EXEC. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971)).
Id.
35.
36.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 18.
37.
For a more detailed discussion of the interim obligation, see infra Part V.
See also Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligationof Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
71, 114 (1991) ("It is the intent of this article to demonstrate the difficulty inherent in
attempting to adequately define and develop the contours of interim obligation
expressed in article 18."); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty's Object and Purpose
Pending Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 283
(2001) ("While the interim obligation has been recognized in various international legal
systems, it remains unclear how to determine whether the interim obligation is being
violated.").
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defined.3 8 In Part V of this Article, current theories of the interim
obligation are examined and rejected, and a new theory is proposed,
arguing that Article 18 is a test to facilitate domestic treaty review
and temper gamesmanship among states after signature.
Article 19(c): A state may make a reservation to a treaty unless
the reservation is "incompatible" with the object and purpose of the
treaty.3 9
Notably, both Articles 18 and 19(c) create an object and purpose
obligation in negative terms. Article 18 says states must not "defeat"
the object and purpose after signature. 40 Article 19(c) mandates that
reservations not be "incompatible" with the object and purpose of the
treaty.4 1 Part IV of this Article considers Article 19(c) and what it
means to deem a reservation incompatible with a treaty's object and
purpose.
Article 20(2): "When it appears from .

.

. the object and purpose

of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety between all
the parties is an essential condition of the consent to be bound ..
a
reservation requires acceptance by all parties." 42
The law surrounding reservations is complex and burdened with
a web of rules. Article 20(2) creates one of the highest hurdles:
unanimous approval of all states party in order for a reservation to be
effective. 43 This is a nearly insurmountable hurdle in multilateral
negotiations. By its plain language, Article 20(2) looks solely to the
treaty to determine if any reservation should require unanimous
consent. In other words, unanimous consent may become necessary
regardless of the content of the reservation. 44
Article 31: "A treaty shall be interpreted . . . in light of its object

and purpose." 45
This may be the vaguest invocation of the phrase object and
purpose in the Vienna Convention, and scholars have commented on
its puzzling circularity. 46 The text of a treaty must be interpreted in
light of the treaty's object and purpose, but the treaty's object and

38.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
cmt. i; ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 93-95 (1st ed. 2000).

§ 312

39.
Vienna Convention, supranote 8, art. 19(c).
40.
Id. art. 18.
41.
Id. art. 19(c).
42.
Id. art. 20(2).
43.
Id.
44.
See AUST, supra note 30, at 71 (explaining that in the case of "plurilateral
treaties," art. 20(2) of the Vienna Convention mandates that "any reservation will
require acceptance of all the parties").
45.
Vienna Convention, supranote 8, art. 31.
46.
See Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 1, at 333 (describing the "vicious cycle"
of how "[i]t is not possible to be guided in the interpretation of a treaty by its object and
purpose when those have to be elucidated first by interpreting the treaty").
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purpose must be discovered through interpretation of the text itself.
This circularity problem is discussed in detail in Part III.
Article 33: "When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more
languages [and] when a comparison of the texts discloses a difference
of meaning .

.

. the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having

47
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted."
It is hard to imagine a scenario in which Article 33(4) would be
helpful. Reconciling two translations of a treaty, to be done well,
requires surgical precision and an appreciation for nuances of
language, but the concept of object and purpose remains a blunt tool
yet to be adequately honed. That said, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) applied Article 33(4) on one occasion, finding that a
French-language version of a law (implying that the ICJ has the
power to issue binding provisional orders) better reflected the object
and purpose of the overall statute than an English-language version
(implying otherwise).48
Article 41: "Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty
may conclude an agreement to modify the treaty as between

themselves alone if

. . .

[it] does not relate to a provision, derogation

from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object
and purpose of the treaty as a whole." 49
Like Article 19(c), Article 41 prohibits changes "incompatible"
Article 19(c) concerns
with a treaty's object and purpose.
reservations, whereby one state attempts to alter its treaty
obligations between itself and all other states party.5 0 Article 41, by
contrast, involves the more limited function of altering treaty
obligations between one state and a fraction of the other states
parties. 5 1 Another significant difference is that reservations may be

Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 33(1)-(4).
47.
LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 501-03 (June 21).
48.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 41.
49.
Id. art. 19(c). Whether the reservation will indeed apply to all other parties
50.
depends on whether states accept or reject it. Id. arts. 19-20.
51.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 334 cmt. b (1987) (adopting a special meaning of the word "amendment" in
the Vienna Convention so that it "permits fewer than all the parties to amend the
agreement as between themselves, after affording all states parties the opportunity to
participate in the negotiations"). Compare AUST, supra note 38, at 126
("[R]eservation[s] may be formulated when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty" and they may also be "made at another time if this is provided for
in the treaty."), with id. at 222 (discussing agreements to modify a multinational treaty
between certain persons only). Article 40 deals with modifications between all states
parties and does not mention object and purpose. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art.
40.
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made only when a state becomes a party to a treaty, 52 while
modifications may be crafted at a later date.53
Article 41 also differs from Article 19 because it contains the
words "effective execution" and "as a whole," which may be read as
limiting and softening the prohibition. 54
In other words, a
modification may permissibly infringe on the object and purpose
somewhat, so long as the object and purpose is preserved as a whole.5 5
Functionally, a less stringent standard may be justified on the
grounds that a modification, which is concluded between only a
fraction of states party, is presumably less disruptive than a
reservation, which the reserving state makes vis-A-vis all other states
party. 56
Article 58(1): "Two or more parties to a multilateral treaty may
conclude an agreement to suspend the operation of provisions of the
treaty ... if [such suspension] is not incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty."57
Articles 41 and 58 are parallel. Both articles allow parties to a
multilateral agreement to carve out exceptions to the treaty so long
as those exceptions are between themselves alone and do not affect
other parties.5 8 Article 41 allows for modifications generally, while
Article 58 allows for the ultimate modification: suspension. Article
58, however, does not contain the softening language found in Article
41 regarding "effective execution" and the object and purpose "as a
whole."59 Perhaps the softening language was excluded here because
the drafters saw suspension of a treaty as more threatening to the
treaty's object and purpose than mere modification.60

52.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 19 ("A State may, when signing,
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation . . . .").
53.
The Vienna Convention's rules for modification are silent regarding when a
treaty may be modified. See id. arts. 39-41 (governing the amendment and
modification of treaties); AUST, supra note 38, at 222 (discussing agreements to modify
a multinational treaty between certain persons only).
54.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, arts. 19, 41.
55.
The Restatement ignores the additional language and states only that
modifications may not be incompatible with a treaty's object and purpose.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 334.

56.
The assumption that modifications will be less disruptive than reservations
will not be true in all cases, of course.
57.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 58(1).
58.
Id. art. 41(1)(b)(i) (allowing modification if it "does not affect the enjoyment
by the other parties of their rights under the treaty or the performance of their
obligations").
59.
Id. arts. 41, 58.
60.
We can, however, imagine situations in which modification is more
damaging to the goals of a treaty than outright suspension.
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Article 60: "A material breach of a treaty .. . consists in . . . the

violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object
or purpose of a treaty."6 1
Article 60 raises complex questions about treaty obligations.
This is the only instance within the Vienna Convention where the
words object and purpose are combined using the disjunctive word
"or" rather than the conjunctive word "and." At least one scholar has
suggested this unique formulation-"object or purpose"-is used "so
as not to restrain the notion of a material breach." 62 In short, the
term "material breach" should be interpreted relatively broadly. On
the other hand, Article 60 defines a material breach to include actions
that violate provisions essential to the accomplishment of the object
or purpose of the treaty. This could be read very narrowly: assuming
a treaty's object and purpose is its essential content,6 3 Article 60 is
doubly narrow, proscribing violations of what is essential to the
essential content of a treaty. However, such an interpretation is
troubling because it would permit states wide latitude to violate a
treaty's terms without coming within the proscribed realm of
"material breach."
A better understanding of Article 60 reads the obligation more
broadly, accounting for the disjunctive "or" and placing emphasis on
the word "accomplishment." Pursuant to that understanding, a
material breach includes either (i) the violation of a treaty's object or
purpose, or (ii) the violation of any clause essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose, even if that particular
clause is not itself part of the object or purpose. 64 Another reason to
interpret material breach in this manner is to distinguish it from a
more egregious "fundamental breach." Fundamental breach is not
mentioned within the Vienna Convention, but it has since been
recognized as a "breach that goes to the root of a treaty" and
"undermine[s its] fundamental basis." 65 In the case of a fundamental
breach, states party have greater latitude to suspend the terms of a
treaty than they would in the case of a material breach. 66 If material

61.
62.

Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 60.
Paul Reuter, Solidarit6 et divisibilitd des engagement conventionnels, in

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHABTAI ROSENNE

623, 628 n.9 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds. 1989).
63.
This assumption is considered in more detail in Parts II and IV, infra.
64.
See AUST, supra note 38, at 238-39 (explaining the concept of material
breach).
Id. at 296 (citing Kevin Chamberlain, Collective Suspension of Air Services,
65.
32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 616, 630-31 (1983); Ghislaine Richard, KAL 007: The Legal
Fallout,9 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 146, 150 (1984)).
See id. at 295-96 (discussing the differences between material breach and
66.
fundamental breach).
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breach is read too strictly, it eliminates the distinction between these
two categories.
These eight uses of the term object and purpose touch upon
treaty interpretation, reservations, modifications, material breaches,
and obligations prior to ratification. The term's ambiguity adds
confusion to each of these areas. The next three Parts focus on three
particular uses of the term.

III. ARTICLE 31: THE GENERAL RULE OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
A. Defining Object and Purpose
Article 31 is titled "General Rule of Interpretation." It begins:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context

and in light of its object and purpose. 6 7

This general rule of treaty interpretation highlights three sources in
which practitioners may seek the meaning of a treaty: the treaty's
terms, the context of those terms, and the treaty's object and
purpose. 68 The Vienna Convention defines context to include "any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty" as well as
"any instrument ... made by one or more parties ... and accepted by
the other parties." 69 Practitioners must also take into account, in
addition to the context, relevant subsequent agreements between the
parties, relevant subsequent practice of the parties, and any relevant
rules of international law.7 0
These sources-text, context, and object and purpose-reflect
three schools of treaty interpretation. 71
First, the objective
(textualist) school "start[s] from the proposition that there must exist
a presumption that the intentions of the parties are reflected in the
text of the treaty which they have drawn up, and that the primary
goal of treaty interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of this
text." 72 The subjective school, by contrast, "assert[s] that the
primary, and indeed only, aim and goal of treaty interpretation is to
ascertain the intention of the parties[,]" and, in so doing, it is

67.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31.
68.
BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 604-07.
69.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(2).
Id. art. 31(3).
70.
71.
IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 114-15
(2d ed. 1984).
72.
Id.
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permissible to go beyond the four corners of the text.73 Lastly, the
teleological school asserts that the practitioner "must first ascertain
the object and purpose of a treaty and then interpret it so as to give
effect to that object and purpose." 74 The Vienna Convention's general
rule for treaty interpretation is a compromise combining all three
approaches, though textualism is dominant.7 5 According to the rule,
treaty interpretation must rely primarily on the terms of a treaty
while context and the treaty's object and purpose must inform its
meaning.7 6
The general rule of treaty interpretation is important for the
purposes of this Article both because it uses the term object and
purpose and because it provides a framework for interpreting the
Vienna Convention itself. Thus, in accord with that framework,
interpretation of the term object and purpose must begin with the
words' ordinary meaning. One dictionary defines "object" as "[t]he
purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort."7 7 The word
"purpose" is defined as "[t]he object toward which one strives or for
which something exists."7 8 Each word is thus defined by the other,
and both are synonymous with the word "goal." Accordingly, object
and purpose appears to be a unitary concept referring to the goals
that the drafters of the treaty hoped to achieve.7 9 Although this, too,
raises an important question: if object and purpose refers to a unitary
concept, why did the Convention's drafters use two words instead of
one?

73.
74.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115.

75.

See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of the Second

Part of Its Seventh Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 169, 220, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.1 (explaining that Article 27 "is based on the view that the text must be
presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties" and thus, "the
starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an
investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties").
76.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31(1). There is an important caveat
to the Vienna Convention's command that practitioners take context into account when
interpreting a treaty: subsequent actions such as supplemental agreements and
subsequent state practice count for more than prior drafting history. See Vienna
Convention, supra note 8, art. 32 (allowing practitioners to rely on drafting history
(travauxpreparatoires)only when "interpretation according to Article 31 ... leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or
unreasonable").
77.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1211 (4th ed.
2000).
78.
Id. at 1423.
79.
This seems to be consistent with generally accepted tools of statutory
interpretation. For further discussion on the general meaning of "object and purpose,"
see ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF

TREATIES ch. 7,

§ 1 (2007)

(Neth.).
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The context of the term object and purpose provides little insight
into its meaning: there are no supplemental agreements to the
Vienna Convention that elaborate on the term, and subsequent state
practice is opaque.8 0 The teleology of the term object and purpose
(that is to say, the object and purpose of the object and purpose)
suggests that the term is a unitary concept-or at most a binary
concept capturing two very closely related ideas. The command to
interpret a treaty "in light of its object and purpose" suggests a
holistic mode of interpretation that accounts for more than the goals
of specific treaty provisions and encompasses the normative logic that
presents itself when the entirety of the treaty's provisions are
considered together.8 1
Prior to the drafting of the Vienna Convention, the ICJ
considered the term object and purpose, and it adopted a binary view.
In its 1951 advisory opinion on the Genocide Convention, the ICJ
equated "purpose" with "intention" and held that the intention behind
the Genocide Convention is: "[T]o condemn and punish genocide as a
crime under international law involving a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks the
conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity." 82
The ICJ further found that the Genocide Convention has two objects.
One is "to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups"; the
other is "to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of
morality."83 The ICJ failed to explain why it understood the words
object and purpose as two separate ideas and in what ways the two
ideas are different and distinct.84 The Court also failed to explain

80.
See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION (1970) (discussing various supplementary

materials used to interpret the Vienna Convention but making no mention of the
context surrounding the term object and purpose).
81.
The term "normative logic" is an intentional echo of the Weberian concept
of "value rationality." Value rationality is a mode of rationality used to define one's
ultimate ends, as distinct from instrumental rationality, which is used to formulate a
means of achieving one's ends. MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 24-25 (Guenther
Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968). The term is used here
to refer to both the ends of a treaty and also the relative importance of those ends as
compared to other perhaps competing ends. Such a hierarchy of values is rarely made
explicit in the text of a treaty, but it may be discerned in the means a treaty deploys to
achieve its ends. For instance, a convention to protect refugees may require states to
provide refugees within their territory with a minimum standard of care but fail to
provide an enforcement mechanism when the standard is not met, thus evidencing a
concern for refugee protection but not at the cost of state sovereignty.
82.
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28) (quoting G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N.
Doc. A/64/Add.1 (Dec. 11, 1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
83.
Id.
84.
See id. (listing object and purpose as two separate ideas without
elaboration).
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how it discovered the one purpose and two objects of the Genocide
Convention.8 5 Scholars have dismissed it as a determination made
"simply by intuition," 86 and it is difficult to quarrel with that
assertion.
Despite the ICJ's treatment of object and purpose as a binary
concept, the unitary view is more appropriate because it fits with the
ordinary meaning of the two words "object" and "purpose."
Furthermore, the weight of scholarly writing supports a unitary
view.87 Indeed, "most scholars in the German, Austrian, and English
tradition treat 'object and purpose' of a treaty as a joint notion."8 8
Only a strain of French scholarship approaches the two as separate
concepts.8 9 For example, J.P. Jacque argues that object refers to the
rights and duties a treaty creates, and purpose refers to the goals
that the treaty's authors sought to achieve by creating those rights
and duties.9 0 However, even among French scholars, it has been
suggested that the binary view is being imported from French
administrative law and imposed on international law, where there is
less basis for it.91
The unitary view is also preferable because the binary view
complicates treaty interpretation without offering notable
advantages. Indeed, the distinction between the two views may be
only a "question of semantics," to which "the best solution .

.

. is to

consider the expression 'object and purpose' as a unitary one
reflecting two closely interrelated aspects of a single idea." 92 In sum,
the term object and purpose refers broadly to a treaty's goals and the
character of the means employed to achieve them.
B. Applying Object and Purpose in Practice
Having defined the term object and purpose, the next task is to
apply it. In other words, what method should the practitioner use to
discover a treaty's object and purpose?9 3 A textual approach asks

85.
See id. (noting one purpose and two objects of the Genocide Convention
without elaboration).
86.
Buffard & Zemanek, supranote 1, at 319.
Id. at 325
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
90.
Id. at 326 (quoting J.P. JACQUE, ELEMENTS POUR UNE THEORIE DE L'ACTE
JURIDIQUE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 142 (1972) (Fr.)).
Id. at 327 (quoting Reuter, supra note 62, at 628 n.9).
91.
92.
Id. at 328 (quoting MAARTEN Bos, A METHODOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 153 (1984)).
93.
In some instances, the object and purpose is stated explicitly within the
text of the treaty. For a list of examples, see supranote 25.
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what intention is manifest in the text of the treaty. 94 A more
subjective approach asks what intention was in the minds of the
treaty's drafters.9 5
A subjective approach may be more appropriate for determining
a treaty's object and purpose than it would be for determining the
meaning of specific terms within the treaty. After all, object and
purpose refers to the goals that motivated the drafting and
ratification of a treaty. Therefore, it is natural to look to the motives
of the people and institutions that held those goals.
But the problem with a subjective method is twofold. First, it
lacks determinacy. Article 31 is a general rule of interpretation, and
as such, it should guide practitioners to the correct understanding of
treaty
provisions,
resolving
disputes
between
competing
interpretations. 96 However, if object and purpose is understood as
the subjective intent of a treaty's drafters, Article 31 would invite
conflict because of the difficulty in discerning each drafter's subjective
intent and then reconciling those multiple intentions into a coherent
whole.97 Second, using object and purpose as a means of inquiring
into the treaty makers' intentions would undermine Article 31's
emphasis on text as the primary focus of treaty interpretation.
Instead, object and purpose should be understood as an objective
concept, referring to the goals of the treaty's drafters as those goals
are reflected in the treaty's text. This is consistent with the assertion
made by Sir Ian Sinclair that "there can be no common intentions of
the parties aside or apart from the text they have agreed upon."9 8
Even when the task of divining the meaning of object and
purpose is limited to the text of a treaty, it gives rise to another
conceptual puzzle.
A treaty's object and purpose is understood
through the treaty's text, but the text is only properly understood
when interpreted in light of the treaty's object and purpose. *
Neither can be fully understood without the other, raising the obvious
question of where to start.
This circularity issue is not as problematic as it first appears.
Statutory interpretation is often a necessary dialectic between the

94.
See Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 1, at 323-24 (describing the textualist
approach as "[t]ypical of the English tradition").
95.
See id. at 323 (explaining that the German-Austrian approach defines
object and purpose as the "general aim of the treaty.").
96.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31 (providing terms of the
"[g]eneral rule of interpretation").
97.
See LINDERFALK, supra note 79, at 204 (explaining the subjectivity of object
and purpose). Ironically, although not owed with certainty, a subjective interpretation
of the Vienna Convention itself may lead to less conflicting results.
98.
Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 1, at 324 (quoting SINCLAIR, supra note 71,
at 130).
99.
Id. at 333 (calling this conceptual difficulty a "vicious circle").
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general and the specific, and by comparing one against the other, we
eventually hone in on the end result. To simplify, the search for a
treaty's meaning can be understood as a series of steps. At Step One,
we review the specific provisions of a treaty looking for common
themes and ideas. (We do this tentatively and with caution, aware
that at first reading, the full import and nuance of each article may
not be apparent.) At Step Two, we examine the general themes and
ideas that came forward in Step One. We try to reconcile these
themes with one another, checking whether they fit together easily or
whether they compete and conflict. Based on this comparison, we
formulate a tentative statement of a treaty's object and purpose. At
Step Three, we return to the specific articles of the treaty,
reexamining them in the light of our tentative statement of the object
and purpose, making notes of conflicts and anomalies. At Step Four,
we return to the general themes, and, based on the conflicts and
anomalies discovered in Step Three, we revise and refine our
statement of the treaty's object and purpose. And so on.100 This
process of moving back and forth from the specific to the general may
be repeated numerous times, but each time, the process moves us
closer to a refined understanding of a treaty's object and purpose.
The metaphor is not a circle spinning endlessly, but rather a spiral
spinning gradually inward and coming, literally and figuratively, to a
point.
The dialectical process outlined above pulls us out of the circle,
but it does not guarantee a single, clear result. Different interpreters
will come to different results depending on how the analysis is
conducted. The point is not that indeterminacy may be avoided, but
rather that the construct of an endless interpretative circle is
overstating the problem.

IV. ARTICLE 19(C): OBJECT, PURPOSE, AND RESERVATIONS

A reservation is a unilateral statement made by a state upon
ratifying a treaty that "modif[ies] the legal effect of certain provisions
of the treaty in their application to that State." 101 The process for
making reservations is governed by Articles 19 through 23 of the
Vienna Convention, and within those articles, the term object and
purpose is used twice but never defined.1 02

100.
Id. at 333-34 (proposing a two-step process similar to the one presented
here for discovering a treaty's object and purpose). Buffard and Zemanek feel their test
fails to provide determinacy as well. Id.
101.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 2(d).
102.
Id. arts. 19-23. In 1975, Judge Jos6 M. Ruda, then a judge on the
International Court of Justice, claimed, "[tihe question of reservations to multilateral
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Within this complex modern regime, the object and purpose test
is best understood as protection against reservations that would
result in incoherent treaty rules. Coherence is a technical term,
developed by Professor Thomas Franck, referring to a rule's logical
consistency. 103 A coherent rule treats like cases alike, and any
distinction it makes between cases must be defensible in light of the
rule's generalized logic-that is, "that distinctions in the treatment of
'likes' [must] be justifiable in principled terms."104 By contrast, an
incoherent rule makes indefensible distinctions which rob a rule of
legitimacy.10 5 Every new reservation has at least the potential to add
incoherence to a treaty. The object and purpose test stands as
protection against such incoherence.
This analysis of the object and purpose test proceeds in two
parts. First, to provide background, it considers the history of the
term object and purpose as it has been used in the context of
reservations. Second, it argues that the object and purpose test is
best understood as a coherence-saving device based on the text of
Article 19(c), its context, the opinion of the ICJ, and state practice.

A. Background
Over the past half-century, the rules for creating reservations
have become increasingly liberal, meaning it has become easier for a
state to attach a reservation to a treaty. Prior to 1951, the generally
accepted rule was that any reservation required the states party to
give unanimous consent. 106 This was a strict test because any single
state could veto any proposed reservation.
In 1951, this rule changed when the ICJ published its Advisory

Opinion Regarding Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of Genocide, in which it introduced the words object
and purpose into the reservations regime.107 The ICJ held, "it is the

treaties has been one of the most controversial subjects in contemporary international
law." Josh M. Ruda, Reservations to Treaties, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS 95, 101 (1975)
(Neth.). Since then, scholars have continued to bemoan the complexity of reservation
law. See, e.g., AUST, supra note 38, at 100 (claiming the law of reservations is
"baffling"); Richard W. Edwards, Reservations to Treaties, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 362, 362
(1989) (stating that the law of reservations is not "clear and stable"); Edward T.
Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 307 (2006) (explaining that the law of
reservations is "complex and controversial").
FRANCK, supra note 19, at 144.
103.
104.
Id.
Id. See infra Part IV.B for a more detailed discussion of coherence.
105.
Edwards, supra note 102, at 388.
106.
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
107.
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28) ("[I]t is the compatibility of a
reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the
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compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose" of a treaty
that is the proper basis for formulating and objecting to a
reservation. 0 8 Notably, the ICJ used the definite article "the" rather
than the indefinite "a," thereby signaling a treaty's object and
purpose is the sole basis for objecting to reservations. The ICJ
decision loosened the rules for attaching reservations by constraining
the basis upon which objections could be made; only objections
premised on the idea that the reservation was incompatible with the
treaty's object and purpose would have legal force.' 0 9 By limiting the
available types of objections, the ICJ made it easier for states to
attach reservations.
The ICJ 's decision drew a quick response from the International
Law Commission, which declared that "the object and purpose
[test] . . . is not suitable for application to multilateral treaties in

general."1 0 The Commission believed that the general rule should
remain a unanimity rule, though an object and purpose test might be
appropriate for some treaties.'
Then, in 1953, the Commission
suggested creating a special "chamber of summary procedure" that
would determine when a reservation is incompatible with a treaty's
object and purpose. 112 With this suggestion, the Commission
simultaneously demonstrated its new willingness to jettison the
unanimity rule and its fear of the indeterminacy and conflict that
could result from an object and purpose standard. A chamber of
summary procedure was never formed, but the Commission affirmed
in 1962 that the object and purpose test for reservations should be an
"objective test."113
The ICJ's Genocide Opinion and the responses of the ILC suggest
two standards of review for reservations. For bilateral treaties and
some multilateral treaties, a state could propose any reservation, but
unanimous acceptance was necessary for the reservation to enter into
force. 114 For other multilateral treaties, a state could only propose,
and other states could only object to, reservations based on the their
compatibility or incompatibility with a treaty's object and purpose.n1 5

criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as
for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation.").
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
Edwards, supra note 102, at 389.
111.
Id.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 390.
114.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 490-92 (1966);
SINCLAIR, supra note 71, at 54-55.
115.
See Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28) ("[I]t is the compatibility of a
reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must furnish the
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There was no test for distinguishing multilateral treaties that
merited the first standard of review and those that merited the
second.
In 1969, the rules for reservations changed again when the
Vienna Convention was concluded, thereby establishing the test
which exists today. Under the Vienna Convention, there are two
steps for attaching a valid reservation.116 In Step One, a state
formulates its reservation. In Step Two, the other states respond.
For Step One, the underlying treaty will sometimes explicitly permit
or forbid a list of reservations,1 17 but otherwise, the formulation stage
is governed by Article 19(c), which states:
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless . . . the reservation is
1 18
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

In Step Two, when each contracting state chooses whether to
accept the reservation, there is a range of options. 1 9 A state may
accept the reservation, thereby entering into the treaty with the
reserving state.1 20 It may reject the reservation, thereby refusing to
join the treaty with the reserving state.1 21 Or, it may reject the
reservation and the section of the treaty to which it is addressed
while still entering into the remainder of the treaty with the

criterion for the attitude of a State in making the reservation on accession as well as
for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reservation."); BROWNLIE, supra note
114, at 491 (noting that the ICJ's more permissive standard for reservations was not
unprecedented). "In the period of the League of Nations (1920-46) the practice in
regard to multilateral conventions showed a lack of consistency." Id. Sometimes, states
applied a unanimity rule; other times, they applied more flexible rules. Id.; see J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF

PEACE 322-24 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (explaining the International
Court's holding that "in the case before it a state making a reservation to which some
but not all the parties objected would become a party if its reservation should be
'compatible with the object and purpose of the convention,' but not otherwise").
116.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, arts. 19-23. In practice, contracting
states challenge a reservation for being incompatible with a treaty's object and purpose
(step one) and object to a reservation for other reasons (step two) simultaneously. More
important than the chronology, for our purposes, is the functional difference between
the two steps.
117.
Id. art. 19(a)-(b).
118.
Id. art. 19(c).
119.
Because it contains the object and purpose test, Article 19(c) is the focus of
the present analysis, but before looking at that article in detail, it is helpful to have an
understanding of the second step for making reservations.
120.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 20(4)(a). Also, a state may remain
silent with regard to a reservation, and "a reservation is considered to have been
accepted by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a
period of twelve months." Id. art. 20(5).
121.
Id. art. 20(4)(b).
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reserving state.122 A state's objection need not be premised on the
object and purpose standard-or any other standard for that matter.
Indeed, an objecting state is not required to give any basis for its
objection.
An important innovation of the Vienna Convention is that a
"reservation does not modify the provisions of the treaty for the other
parties to the treaty inter se" (literally "between themselves").1 23 This
means that State A may propose a reservation which is accepted by
State B, but B's acceptance will not affect State C's right to accept or
reject the reservation between itself and A. Nor will B's response
alter the effects of the treaty between C and A, or even between C and
B.1 24
These two factors-the inter se rule and the range of options for
accepting or rejecting a treaty-combine to create a regime that is
considerably more complex and more accommodative of reservations
than the older, unanimous consent scheme. The old rule gave every
state veto power over every proposed reservation, and this veto power
would nullify the reservation's effect among all contracting states. 125
The new rule allows each pair of states within a multilateral treaty to
determine how the reservation will affect them bilaterally without
interfering with other states party.126
This new regime represents more than just a change in
procedure. It is a paradigm shift. The unanimous consent rule
conceptualized a multilateral treaty as a single, integral agreement.
No exceptions or changes were permitted unless all contracting states
agreed. The current regime, by contrast, casts a multilateral treaty
as a bundle of parallel bilateral agreements, and each pair of states
has the freedom, within limits, to craft the details of the agreement
between themselves alone without affecting other states.
The limit on this freedom is found in the object and purpose test.
A state may not attach a reservation that is incompatible with the
treaty's object and purpose, and, by virtue of Article 19(c), other
states have a legal basis for objecting to such a reservation-not just
between themselves and the reserving state but among all. states
party. In this way, Article 19(c) is unique among the Vienna
Convention's reservation rules because it is the narrow avenue by
which states may make inter se objections. 127 Thus, if State A
proposes an incompatible reservation, State B may object citing

122.
Id. arts. 20(4)(b), 21(3).
123.
Id. art. 21(2).
124.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 313(3) (1987).
125.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 21.
126.
It is yet to be seen how this shift will affect future treaties.
127.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 19(c).
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Article 19(c), and this objection, if successful, will void the reservation
as between all states party.
This insight-that Article 19(c) provides a basis for making inter
se objections-does not by itself explain what it means to say that a
reservation is incompatible with a treaty's object and purpose.
Nonetheless, it provides an important clue. The next section uses
this clue, in conjunction with the text and usage of Article 19(c), to
provide a new, clearer understanding of the object and purpose test.

B. The Object and Purpose Test as a SafeguardAgainst Incoherence
Article 19(c)'s object and purpose test is best understood as a test
to preserve treaty rule coherence. The word coherence is used here in
a technical sense; it is a jurisprudential concept elaborated by
Professor Franck. 12 8 It means that "in applying a rule, conceptually
alike cases will be treated alike" 129 and that any "distinctions in the
1 30 By contrast,
treatment of 'likes' be justifiable in principled terms."
an incoherent rule is a rule that suffers from "bad distinctions."
Bad distinctions-in
defended by reference
the rule to which they
a] rule that property
numbered addresses
anyone. 131

the sense of distinctions incapable of being
to the generalized logic of the rule-illegitimate
adhere. They make it incoherent. [For example,
taxes will be levied only on houses with evenwould be perceived as illegitimate by almost

Reservations are potential threats to the coherence of a treaty's
rules because they introduce new distinctions into the treaty. If those
distinctions are "incapable of being defended by .

.

. the generalized

logic" of the underlying treaty's rules, then the reservation weakens
the treaty's coherence. 132 As a coherence-preserving device, Article
19(c) blocks reservations with unjustifiable distinctions.
A coherence-based interpretation of Article 19(c) is supported by:
(1) the article's text; (2) the opinion of the ICJ; (3) the structure of the
Vienna Convention's reservation rules; and (4) state practice.
(1)

The Text

According to the coherence-based interpretation, Article
forbids reservations that do not fit (are incompatible/incoherent)
the treaty's generalized logic (its goals/object and purpose).
words incompatible and incoherent overlap in meaning. They

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

FRANCK, supra note 19, at 143-49.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 152.
Id.

19(c)
with
The
both
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derive from Latin roots, the former meaning "[i]ncapable of being held
together"s3 3 and the latter meaning "consisting of parts which do not
stick . . . together."

134

In modern usage, incompatible means

"incapable of existing together in the same subject; contrary or
opposed in character; discordant, incongruous, inconsistent." 135
Incoherent means "not connected or unified by any general principle
or characteristic; inconsistent, uncoordinated." 136 The two words'
meanings overlap when used to refer to ideas or concepts that, when
combined, lack orderly continuity. The term object and purpose
refers to the specific ends a treaty seeks and also the logic and the
normative character of the rights and obligations the treaty creates to
attain those ends.' 3 7 This is akin to Professor Franck's reference to
the "generalized logic" of a treaty. 138 According to Franck, the
generalized logic of a rule refers to the rational principles used to
achieve an end, and a coherent rule must exhibit a "nexus" between
its desired results and the means it uses to distinguish between like
cases.' 3 9 It is this nexus- the rational principles that connect a
rule's ends and means-that should be understood as part of the
object and purpose of a treaty. 140 In this way, "incompatible" is
understood to mean "incoherent," and "object and purpose" is
understood to refer to a treaty's generalized logic, thus supporting a
coherence-based test.
(2) Opinion of the International Court of Justice
The coherence-based interpretation is also supported by the ICJ
opinion wherein that court first proposed an object and purpose test.
As discussed in the preceding section, the ICJ created an object and
purpose test in its Genocide Opinion. 141 In that opinion, the ICJ
explicitly rejected the unanimous consent rule and introduced the
object and purpose test as an alternative limit on reservation
making. 42 Some limit was necessary, the Court explained, because
133.
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(2d.
ed.
1989),
available at
http://dictionary.oed.com/ (search for "incompatible" using the "Find Word" tool).
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
137.
See infra Part III ("A treaty's object and purpose is understood through the
treaty's text, but the text is only properly understood when interpreted in light of the
treaty's object and purpose.").
138.
FRANCK, supra note 19, at 152.
139.
Id. at 146, 180-81.
140.
See WEBER, supra note 81 (stating that the value rationality reflected in a
treaty must fit coherently with its instrumental rationality).
141.
Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28).
Id.
142.
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to hold otherwise would "sacrifice the very object" and "frustrate the
purpose[]" of a treaty. 14 3 With this language, the ICJ was invoking
some value beyond any single state or reservation, implying that an
incompatible reservation threatens not only the integrity of the treaty
obligations for the reserving state alone but also the core of the treaty
for all states party.
The ICJ would not have created the object and purpose test if it
had been focused only on reserving states. A single state's treaty
membership may be conceptualized as a spectrum with 100%
adoption of the treaty's obligations on one end and 0% adoption on the
other, and states that join with reservations fall somewhere between
these two poles. Seen this way, it would be logical to assume that a
treaty's goals would be better served by a state's partial adoption of a
treaty-that is, adoption with a reservation-rather than no adoption
at all. Yet, the ICJ did not embrace this conceptualization. Instead,
it held that, for states insisting on incompatible reservations,
exclusion is necessary.1 4 4 The ICJ never clearly articulated what
damage it envisioned in the wake of an incompatible reservation, but
it saw this damage reaching beyond the obligations of the reserving
state. 14 5
The coherence-based interpretation of the object and purpose test
provides a compelling description of that far-reaching threat.
Incoherent reservations erode a treaty's legitimacy and its compliance
pull. They reach beyond the reserving state and strike at the core of
a treaty, undermining the treaty for all states party. This is how, to
use the ICJ's language, a reservation may "sacrifice the very object"
of a treaty.146
(3)

Context: The Structure of the Vienna Convention's Reservation
Regime

The coherence-based interpretation of Article 19(c) is supported
by that article's place within the Vienna Convention's regime
governing reservations. Article 19(c) is unique because it provides a
legal basis for making inter se objections, and as a safeguard for
treaty coherence, it is appropriate that states be able to make

143.
Id. at 24.
144.
Id. at 29. Article 19(c) forces states to choose: they must commit to the
negotiated terms of the treaty beyond some threshold level on the scale of zero to one
hundred or remain outside of the treaty entirely. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art.
19(c).
145.
See generally Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of
Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 12-22 (May 28) (noting the
abstract issue of collateral effects of reservations but not addressing it with specificity).
146.
Id. at 24.
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objections inter se. 147 Incoherence affects more than simply the
bilateral give-and-take between two states within a multilateral
treaty. It affects the legitimacy of the entire treaty, so intra se
objections are not enough. To cure incoherence, objecting states need
the power to reach into the proverbial bundle of bilateral connections
and root out the incoherent reservation entirely.148
It is also appropriate that inter se objections have a legal basis.
Even without Article 19(c), states could make political objections inter
se, but a legal objection, unlike a political one, invokes the authority
of the international legal regime. It says, "This reservation must be
withdrawn not only because we, the objecting state, want it
withdrawn but also because it violates international law." Grounding
coherence-based objections in legal norms is appropriate because the
coherence and legitimacy of international law are values that exist
beyond the discrete political interests of any state or states. They are
values shared by all states with an interest in seeing international
law obeyed. To that end, Article 19(c) empowers states to do more
than apply political pressure against an offending reservation.
Through Article 19(c), states can summon the existing authority of
the established legal regime to protect the future authority of
budding legal rules.
(4) State Practice: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
A real world illustration of the use of Article 19(c) to protect
treaty coherence involves CEDAW.149 Immensely popular, CEDAW
boasts 186 states party15 0 that, by joining the treaty, agreed "to take
all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish
existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute
discrimination against women." 151 However, a handful of states
attached troubling reservations premised on religious or social
grounds that interposed significant exceptions to this obligation.152
The Maldives' proposed reservation read:
The Government of the Republic of Maldives will comply with the
provisions of the Convention, except those which the Government may

147.
Supra Part V.A.
148.
FRANCK, supra note 19, at 72-75.
149.
CEDAW, supra note 3.
150.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Status of
Treaties, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women,
http://treaties.un.orgPages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-noIV8&chapter-4&lang-en [hereinafter CEDAW Status] (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
151.
CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 2(f).
152.
Schabas, supra note 4, at 84-86.
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consider contradictory to the principles of the Islamic Sharia upon
15 3
which the laws and traditions of the Maldives is [sic] founded.

In response, a number of states objected, arguing that these
reservations were incompatible with CEDAW's object and purpose. 154
They argued that the Maldives' reservation violated Article 19(c)
because it allowed Sharia law to trump the protections of CEDAW. 5 5
States party to CEDAW pledged themselves to eliminate national
laws that "discriminat[ed] against women," 156 and the Maldives'
reservation would have created an exception to this pledge, whereby
gender discriminatory laws would remain in force in the Maldives if
doing otherwise would be contrary to Sharia law.1 57 Sharia law,
though not uniform across the world,15 8 is invoked in some countries
to justify female genital mutilation, honor killings of women, the
denial of education to women, and gender apartheid. 5 9
The objecting states were not satisfied with rejecting the
reservation only vis-A-vis themselves and the Maldives-an option
available to each objecting state through the Vienna Convention's
Article 20.160 Instead, they sought to nullify the reservation as
between any and all parties to the treaty.'16 Faced with ongoing
criticism from objecting states, the Maldives eventually dropped its
offending reservation and replaced it with a more acceptable, less farreaching one. 16 2

153.
Id. at 85; cf. CEDAW Status, supra note 150 (indicating similar objections
from several other states).
154.
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, supra note 150
(quoting several of these objections). The object and purpose test was applicable both
through the Vienna Convention's Article 19(c) and through one of CEDAW's provisions
that created an identical restriction on reservations. CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 28(2).
The objecting states included Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Sweden. Schabas, supra note 4, at 89.
155.
CEDAW Status, supra note 150 (quoting several of these objections).
156.
CEDAW, supranote 3, art. 2.
157.
See CEDAW Status, supra note 150 (providing several objections to the
reservation of the Maldives).
158.
Marie-Aimbe H61ie-Luca, What is Your Tribe?: Women's Struggles and the
Construction of Muslimness, in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF WOMEN 21, 23 (Courtney W. Howland ed., 1999).

159.

See Mahnaz Afkhami, Gender Apartheid and the Discourse of Relativity of

Rights in Muslim Societies, in RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS
OF WOMEN 67, 69 ("Gender apartheid is clearly defined in all laws and regulations
pertaining to the role of women within the private and public spheres.").
160.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 20(2).
161.
See, e.g., CEDAW Status, supra note 150 (containing Austria's objection,
which reads, "The reservation made by the Maldives is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the Convention .... Austria therefore states that this reservation
cannot alter or modify in any respect the obligations arising from the Convention for
any State Party thereto." (emphasis added)).
162.
The revised reservation reads as follows:
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The CEDAW example illustrates how Article 19(c) is used to
protect treaty coherence. The Maldives' reservation was objectionable
because it added a new distinction to CEDAW's rules and that
distinction was not defensible in light of the generalized logic of the
Convention. CEDAW rests on the premise that many states have
gender discriminatory "laws, regulations, customs and practices" that
should be eliminated. 163 In other words, gender discrimination is not
legitimate simply because it has become entrenched in a society's
laws and customs. This principle is incompatible with a reservation
that permits gender discrimination simply because such
discrimination is part of a society's laws and traditions. From the
perspective of the objecting states, allowing the reservation would
have affected some element of the treaty that reached beyond the
obligations the Maldives was crafting for itself. 164 The objecting
states were concerned that the Maldives' reservation and others like
it would erode the perceived legitimacy of CEDAW, and this erosion
would result more generally in states taking their CEDAW
obligations less seriously. 16 5 The following objection from Norway's
delegation illustrates this point:
[A] reservation by which a State party limits its responsibilities under
the Convention by invoking general principles of internal law may
create doubts about the commitments of the reserving State to the
object and purpose of the Convention and, moreover, contribute to

undermine the basis of international treaty law. It is in the common
interest of States that treaties to which they have chosen to become
parties also are respected, as to their object and purpose, by all
parties.166

The protection of women's rights certainly motivated the
objecting states, but when analyzing how the object and purpose test
works, it is important to note that the test itself did not directly

The Government of the Republic of Maldives expresses its reservation to article
7(a) of the Convention, to the extent that the provision contained in the said
paragraph conflicts with the provision of article 34 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Maldives. . . . The Government of the Republic of Maldives reserves
its right to apply article 16 of the Convention concerning the equality of men
and women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations without
prejudice to the provisions of the Islamic Sharia, which govern all marital and
family relations of percent Muslim population of the Maldives.

Id.
163.
CEDAW, supra note 3, art. 2(f).
164.
For example, Finland's representative stated "the unlimited and undefined
character of the said reservations cast serious doubts about the commitments of the
reserving State to fulfil [sic] its obligations under the Convention. CEDAW Status,
supra note 150.
165.
Id. (providing several objections stating such).
166.
Id. (emphasis added).
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protect Maldivian women. When invoking Article 19(c), the objecting
states did not claim the authority to regulate the rights of women
within the Maldives, nor did they claim that the Maldives'
reservation would directly affect the rights of their (the objecting
states') citizens. 167 Indeed, the fact that the objections ultimately
resulted in greater protection for Maldivian women was entirely
contingent on the response of the Maldivian government. Faced with
Article 19(c) objections, the government may just as well have
terminated its membership in CEDAW, in which case Maldivian
women would have received none of the Convention's protections.16 8
Article 19(c) would not have prevented this outcome and could have
even provoked it. But what Article 19(c) did prevent-what it was
crafted to prevent-were reservations that did not fit with the logic of
the underlying treaty.
Objecting states did not use the words "rule coherence" when
they invoked Article 19(c), but it was coherence they were trying to
protect. States were worried not merely about the rights of women in
one individual country-though presumably this was a concern-but
also about the larger threat to CEDAW's legitimacy. States would
have felt less obligation to comply with CEDAW as its legitimacy
waned, and the protections it affords women would have become less
meaningful.
In sum, coherence-based interpretation of Article 19(c) is
supported by the text of the article, the opinion of the ICJ, state
practice, and the function of the article within the context of the
Vienna Convention's reservation regime.
According to this
interpretation, when a state invokes Article 19(c), it is arguing that a
particular reservation would add incoherent distinctions to a treaty's
rules.
To be sure, even if states explicitly adopt the coherence-based
interpretation, they will continue to debate which reservations violate
the test, but this would be an improvement over the under-theorized,
undefined alternative. Rather than rake the surface of two undefined
terms-"incompatible" and "object and purpose"-states should root
their arguments in the theoretical foundation of coherence and
legitimacy. This would allow a more focused and sophisticated
discussion of whether the test is satisfied.

167.
See, e.g., id. ("The Government of Portugal considers that these
reservations cannot alter or modify in any respect the obligations arising from the
Convention for any State party thereto.").
168.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, arts. 54-64 (providing termination rules).
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V. ARTICLE 18: THE INTERIM OBLIGATION
Article 18 forbids signatory states from undertaking any action
that would "defeat" the object and purpose of a treaty. Yet, neither
the text of the Vienna Convention nor subsequent practice has
adequately defined these terms, leaving ambiguous the scope of the
prohibition. The remainder of this Article takes a critical look at four
tests used to understand Article 18 and suggests that, in their place,
a new test should be adopted. This new test is premised on the idea
that Article 18 exists to facilitate domestic review of pending treaties
by preserving the status quo at the time of signature.
A. Background
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention reads as follows:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object
and purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting
the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is
not unduly delayed. 169

The first sentence of Article 18 creates the obligation-not to
defeat a treaty's object and purpose-and subsections (a) and (b)
describe when the obligation applies. Article 18 is known as the
"interim obligation" because it governs state conduct in the period
between a state signaling its intention to join a treaty (i.e., signature)
and the moment the state either becomes bound to the treaty (i.e.,
ratification) or makes clear its intention not to become a party to the
treaty. 170
The time between signature and ratification allows governments
to review a treaty before the state becomes fully bound. 17 1 In the
past, signature alone was sufficient to bind a state to a treaty, which

169.
Id. art. 18.
170.
Id. Precisely how a state makes clear its intention not to be bound by a
treaty has been the subject of much debate. In the vernacular, the concept of
"unsigning" treaties has come into vogue, although there is no such action recognized
in treaty law. See Jonas, supra note 6, at 1042-44 ("[Tlhere is no term in the formal
international law lexicon for 'unsigning' a treaty, although that term has crept into
common usage both inside and out of the legal community.").
171.
SINCLAIR, supra note 71, at 29, 39-41.

2010/

THE OBJECTAND PURPOSE OFA TREA TY

595

was logical in a system of primarily monarchical states. 172
International law assumed that each state's representative had
authority to make a binding commitment on behalf of the state, so
treaties entered into force upon signature, and any subsequent
ratification by the head of state "merely confirmed the agent's act of
signature."1 7 3 As monarchy was replaced in many states by more
complex systems of government, however, this assumption became
less realistic, 174 and many governments now require that some
treaties be approved by their legislative branch before an executive
can bind the state. 175 With the interim obligation, international law
accommodates this practice.
As ratification became the ultimate binding act, the drafters of
the Vienna Convention were left to decide what significance remained
for signature. Signature could not retain its traditional status as the
ultimate binding act because that would undo the shift towards
meaningful ratification and frustrate states in their attempts to
review treaties according to domestic procedures.
The Vienna
Convention adopts a middle position whereby signature is more than
ceremonial but does not fully bind a state1 76 unless a state clearly
intends its signature to have binding effect.17 7
This middle ground between no obligation and full commitment
to a treaty reflects two competing goals. Domestically, the interim
obligation protects political accountability by accommodating
domestic review of pending treaties. 178 Domestic laws that require
multi-branch review of a treaty exist to subject new international
commitments to a wider swath of political actors.17 9 For instance, in
the United States, the President is required to obtain the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate before ratifying a treaty, 18 0 and

172.
Id.
173.
Charme, supra note 37, at 85-86.
174.
SINCLAIR, supranote 71, at 30; Charme, supra note 37, at 86.
175.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties. . . ."); DUNCAN B. HOLLIS
ET AL., NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 161, 258-60, 323-24, 419-21, 544-47,
733-34 (2005) (documenting similar legal provisions for China, France, Germany,
Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom).
176.
Charme, supra note 37, at 88-89.
177.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 26 ("Every treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.").
178.
Charme, supra note 37, at 89 ("Treaty making in this fashion is deemed
necessary to allow signatory states time to contemplate the treaty and its potential
domestic and international ramifications before the signatory state is bound.").
179.
HOLLIS ET AL., supra note 175, at 23-24 ("Whether as a matter of national
law or practice, states authorize various actors outside of the executive (e.g., the
legislature, the courts, sub-national units, or even the populace at large) to restrict
when or how the executive may exercise its treaty authorities.").
180.
U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2. For examples of other countries requiring some sort
of domestic review, see supra note 175.
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the interim obligation facilitates this process because it allows the
President to conclude negotiations by signing a treaty without fully
binding the United States to the treaty prior to senatorial review.
Internationally, the interim obligation furthers a different goal,
facilitating cooperation between signatory states. 18 1 When a state
signs a treaty, it makes a legal commitment not to defeat the treaty's
object and purpose. 182 Other states may rely on that commitment as
they deliberate over the merits of a pending treaty, secure in the
knowledge that all signatories are committed, at least temporarily, to
a threshold level of cooperation.
The interim obligation thus attempts to reconcile two competing
concerns. One concern is that states are not fully bound by the
provisions of a treaty without the opportunity to review it under
domestic procedures, and the second concern is that states may rely
on one another to some degree to act in accordance with the recently
negotiated obligations. The second concern is a product of the first,
allowing domestic political institutions to review a pending treaty
without substantial risk of other states suddenly acting in opposition
to the treaty, thereby reducing uncertainty and raising states' ability
to accurately weigh the costs and benefits of ratification.
B. The Essential Elements Test
Multiple theories have been suggested to explain how, in
reconciling these goals, the interim obligation should be applied.
Under one theory, the term object and purpose is understood to mean
the "essential goals" of a treaty, 8 3 and Article 18 forbids states from
violating those goals. According to this interpretation, a signatory
state need not comply with every part of a treaty, but it must comply
with the most important parts.184 This essential elements test is
appealing because it is an intuitive reading of the language of Article
18. Object and purpose is understood to mean "essential elements,"
and "defeat" is understood as "violate"; by transporting these words
into Article 18, the test is born.
The test is also appealing because it reinforces the idea that
signature is a significant act. Signature is a legal promise between
states, often made after intensive negotiations, and it represents a

181.
BRIERLY, supra note 115, at 319-21.
182.
Cf. Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31.1 ("A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.").
183.
Buffard & Zemaneck, supra note 1, at 331-32.
Id. at 332 ("[T]he treaty provisions actually agreed upon might become
184.
more or less irrelevant as long as the conduct of the parties achieved the aim of the
treaty.").

20101

THE OBJECTAND PURPOSE OF A TREA TY

597

political and policy commitment by the executive on behalf of a state.
It seems appropriate that this promise should protect, at least, the
most important aspects of the newly negotiated agreement.
However, the essential elements test suffers from two significant
problems. First, the test offers little protection for domestic political
factions. The essential elements test accommodates domestic review
only for the less significant, nonessential parts of a treaty. The more
significant, essential parts of the treaty are binding immediately
upon signature, depriving domestic political factions of the same full
opportunity to review those obligations before the state is bound by
them. Where protection is needed most, protection is least given, and
vice versa.
The second problem with the essential elements test is that it
offers no objective method for determining which parts of a treaty are
the "essential" parts. 8 5 A treaty's object and purpose cannot be
reduced to specific articles because object and purpose is an
inherently abstract concept. 186 Without an authoritative judge to
resolve the question, states can only dispute inconclusively whether a
particular provision of a treaty is indeed part of its object and
purpose.
In other contexts, this abstractness is less problematic. For
example, Article 31 requires that a treaty be interpreted in light of its
object and purpose.1 87 In that context, object and purpose is merely a
lens through which practitioners must read the treaty. The actual
point of focus is on the treaty's articles, so the object and purpose
need not be articulated except at a high level of generalization. By
contrast, the essential elements test looks directly at the object and
purpose and attempts to reduce it to specific rules. Rather than
looking through the metaphorical lens to see something beyond it, the
practitioner must look at the lens and describe its precise contours.
However, any attempt to move from high-level abstraction to specific
features will fail for lack of a clear standard. In practically all cases,
there is no objective method for determining which articles of a treaty
are the essential ones or what actions defeat them.
The essential elements test is a straightforward reading of
Article 18, but it fails to protect domestic political factions and is
unworkably subjective.
Within academic literature, it has been
eclipsed by another, more objective standard: the impossible
performance test.

185.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 18 (listing no objective criteria
for defining "object" or "purpose").
186.
Supra Part III.
187.
Vienna Convention, supranote 8, art. 31.
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C. The Impossible Performance Test
The drafters of the Vienna Convention provided eight examples
of actions that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty,'8 8 and,
at first glance, these examples appear to support the proposition that
Article 18 embodies an "impossible performance" standard, wherein a
treaty's object and purpose is defeated if subsequent performance of
the treaty becomes impossible or "meaningless."
Of the eight examples, the first six come from the authors of an
early draft of the Vienna Convention known as the 1935 Harvard
Draft. These examples are:
(1) A treaty contains an undertaking on the part of a signatory that [the
signatory] will not fortify a particular place on its frontier or that it will
demilitarize a designated zone in that region. Shortly thereafter, while
ratification is still pending, it proceeds to erect the forbidden
fortifications or to increase its armaments within the zone referred to.
(2) A treaty binds one signatory to cede a portion of its public domain to
another; during the interval between signature and ratification the
former cedes a part of the territory promised to another State.
(3) A treaty binds one signatory to make restitution of certain property
to the other signatory from which it has been wrongfully taken, but,
while ratification is still pending, it destroys or otherwise disposes of
the property, so that in case the treaty is ratified restitution would be
impossible.
(4) A treaty concedes the right of the nationals of one signatory to
navigate a river within the territory of the other, but the latter, soon
after the signature of the treaty, takes some action which would render
navigation of the river difficult or impossible.
(5) By the terms of a treaty both or all signatories agree to lower their
existing tariff rates, but while ratification of the treaty is pending one
of them proceeds to raise its tariff duties.
(6) A treaty provides that one of the signatories shall undertake to
deliver to the other a certain quantity of the products of a forest or a
mine, but while ratification is pending, the signatory undertaking the
engagement destroys the forest or the mine,.or takes some action which
results in such diminution of their output that performance of the
189
obligation is no longer possible.

The International Law Commission considered two more examples in
1965:
(7) A treaty provides for the return of art work taken from the territory
of another state. Prior to ratification, the signatory either destroys or
allows the destruction of the art work.

188.
Summary Records of the 788th Meeting, [1965] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 87, 92,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1965.
189.
Charme, supra note 37, at 98-99 (citing James W. Garner, Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 653, 781-82 (1935)).
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(8) A treaty provides for the cession of certain installations by a
signatory in another State. The ceding State destroys the installations
190
or allows for their destruction.

Based on these examples, the standard for defeating a treaty's
object and purpose is stringent. Examples (3) and (7) involve the
restitution of property, and to violate Article 18, a state would need to
destroy the property prior to transfer. Thus, some scholars have said
that a treaty's object and purpose is defeated when subsequent
performance of the treaty would be "impossible."' 9 1 Other scholars
use the word "meaningless."1 92 Either way, the standard is high,
signaling that only conduct that renders performance of the treaty
impossible, meaningless, or considerably more difficult than the
parties had anticipated during negotiations violates Article 18.
However, examples (1) and (5) conflict with the impossible
performance standard. Example (1) involves the building of forts and
the amassing of armaments along a national border. Such a buildup
would be illegal after the treaty enters into force, but it does not
follow that the treaty's subsequent performance would be impossible
if the same buildup occurred prior to ratification. The state could,
after all, disarm and dismantle bases new and old along the border.
This is an instance where some scholars have argued that the
difference between the words "impossible" and "meaningless" is
material.19 3 If the treaty called for both bordering states to reduce
their arsenals by a factor of one half, but immediately prior to
ratification one state doubled its existing arsenal, it would not be
"impossible" for the state to reduce its now-expanded arsenal by one
half, but the complete transaction would be "meaningless" in the
sense that the arsenal would be, in the end, the same size as it had
been before the treaty negotiations.
This distinction between impossible and meaningless is facile,
and it glosses over the importance of shared expectations between
treaty partners. The example given by the drafters of the Vienna
Convention makes no mention of ratios or proportional reductions in
arsenals.194 Even if it did, it would not be impossible or meaningless
to destroy the newly built forts or reduce the recently expanded
arsenals to the level ostensibly contemplated during negotiations so
that a state could meaningfully perform its treaty obligation.
Example (5) is also incompatible with the impossible
performance test. It involves the lowering of tariffs between states.

190.
Id. at 99.
191.
Id. at 101-02.
192.
Id. (quoting VIARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATIES 322 (1985)).
193.
VILLIGER, supra note 192, at 322.
194.
Cf. Charme, supra note 37, at 98-99 (failing to mention nuclear arsenals).
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If one state suddenly raised its tariffs prior to ratification, this would
not render it impossible or meaningless for the state, upon
ratification, to lower its tariffs to the levels manifestly intended
during negotiations.
Thus, examples (1) and (5) both raise the possibility that some
actions defeat a treaty's object and purpose even when subsequent
performance has not been rendered impossible.
A second difficulty with the impossible performance test is
applying it to multilateral treaties. Some of the examples above
contemplate only two parties, referring as they do to "one signatory"
and "the other,"195 and some drafters of the Vienna Convention even
suggested that Article 18 should not apply to multilateral treaties.1 96
A delegate to the International Law Commission averred that "the
[drafting] Commission had been thinking mainly of bilateral
treaties."1 97 In the context of a multilateral treaty, he stated, "it
would be difficult to accept the idea that between the time when the
treaty was adopted, or even negotiated, and the time when it was
ratified, a single State could commit acts which 'frustrate' its
objects."' 98 To understand what the delegate meant, consider, for
example, a treaty to end torture. If one signatory state engages in
torture prior to ratification, this act does not defeat the goals of
preventing torture and shaming those who practice it. Rather, the
fresh violation makes the treaty's goals even more compelling.199
It explicitly
Again, however, example (5) stands out.
contemplates more than two signatory states. Furthermore, the
treaties mentioned in the other seven examples could be negotiated
multilaterally, and, presumably, it is not the number of parties to a
treaty that determines its object and purpose. Rather, the object and
purpose is a function of a treaty's subject matter.
Crucially, the language of Article 18 makes no distinction
between bilateral and multilateral treaties. The drafters decided not
to incorporate this distinction into the final text, and it is contrary to
accepted principles of treaty construction to read the distinction into
the text. 20 0 That the drafters explicitly considered limiting Article 18

195.

This is the case with examples (3) and (4). Supra text accompanying note

189.
196.
Summary Records of the 788th Meeting, supra note 188, at 92 ("The
objections of governments related mainly to multilateral treaties.").
197.
Id.
Id.
198.
199.
Cf. Klabbers, supra note 37, at 286 ("[I]t is awkward to argue that states
have a right to lay landmines if they have signed .. . a treaty prohibiting such
practices, simply because the calendar has not yet reached a certain date.").
200.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 31.1 (mandating that treaty text
must be interpreted according to its "ordinary meaning"); LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF
TREATIES 365 (1961) (explaining treaty interpretation is "the duty of giving effect
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to bilateral treaties but chose not to do so is strong evidence that the
article applies to all treaties without regard to the number of
negotiating states.
Because the distinction between bilateral and multilateral
treaties is troubling in the context of the impossible performance test,
the practitioner's challenge becomes either applying the test to
multilateral treaties in a meaningful way-an option which has so far
proven unsuccessful-or finding a better test.
D. The Bad Faithand Manifest Intent Tests
Professor Jan Klabbers argues that the relevant distinction is
not between bilateral and multilateral treaties but instead between
(or norm-creating)
contract-based treaties and law-creating
treaties. 201 A contract-based treaty memorializes a contract-like
arrangement between two (or more) states engaged in a reciprocal
exchange of considerations. 202 In a law-creating treaty, on the other
hand, a collection of states (possibly two but usually more) agree to
abide by particular rules of conduct.2 0 3 This could include rules to
prevent and punish acts of genocide, a rule not to test nuclear
weapons, rules to maintain a free trade zone, and so on. By labeling
one type of treaty "law-creating," Klabbers does not mean that
contract-based treaties are not themselves binding international law;
they are.204 The labels merely denote the different character of the
two types of treaties-not a difference in their legal validity or
vitality.
Klabbers argues that the impossible performance standard is
inadequate when applied to law-creating treaties.20 5 It is impractical
to render impossible the subsequent performance of a law-creating
treaty. 206 The more egregiously a state violates the proposed law, the
more urgently relevant the law becomes. 207
As an alternative to the impossible performance test, Klabbers
suggests a "manifest intent" test, which he defines in the following
manner:

to . .. [the parties'] intention as expressed in the words used by them"); SINCLAIR, supra
note 71, at 115.
201.
Klabbers, supra note 37, at 289-91.

202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.

205.
Id. at 291.
206.
Id. at 293 (arguing that public expectations may render treaties effective
even when violated).

207.

Id.
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[I]f behavior seems unwarranted and condemnable, it may be assumed
to have been inspired by less than lofty motivations and ought to be
condemned, regardless of whether anyone's legitimate expectations are
really frustrated or can reasonably be said to have been frustrated,
208
regardless of actual proof of bad faith.

Klabbers believes this test is superior to the impossible performance
test because it provides Article 18 force and relevance in the context
of law-creating treaties. 209
With the manifest intent test, Klabbers seeks to combine the
scope of a bad faith test with the objectivity of the impossible
performance test. 2 10 The impossible performance test is objective
because it is focused on the observable world, concerned with a
variety of questions. Can these cultural artifacts be returned to their
state of origin? Can this river be navigated by foreign vessels? Can
these military fortifications be deconstructed?2 11 A bad faith test, by
contrast, covers a wider range of actions-actions which intuitively
Article 18 should cover-but the test is difficult to apply because it is
focused on the inner "mind" of a state rather than on the outer
observable world. 2 12 The manifest intent test is similar to the bad
faith test because it is concerned with the motivations of the acting
state, but, like the impossible performance test, it is focused on
observable, objective evidence. 213
However, the difference between the bad faith and the manifest
intent tests is not, as Klabbers suggests, one of subjectivity versus
objectivity. 214 Although the bad faith test is phrased as a subjective
test, practitioners cannot delve into the subjectivity of a state or its
leaders. Instead, they must rely on objective evidence; they must rely
on the state's external manifestations of bad faith. The difference
between the bad faith and manifest intent tests is actually only a
lower standard of proof. Under a bad faith test, a state violates
Article 18 if its actions are unwarranted or condemnable, 215 while
under the manifest intent test, the actions need only "seem
unwarranted and condemnable

faith."216

. . .

regardless of actual proof of bad

208. . Id. at 330.
209.
Id. at 331.
210.
Id. at 304-05.
211.
Id. at 299-302 (referring to the impossible performance standard as the
legitimate expectations test and noting that concrete, observable damages can be
measured).
212.
Id. at 303.
213.
Id. at 305 ("A manifest intent test has two clear advantages. First, it has
the distinct advantage of being relatively objective. . . . Second, it can do justice to
reality far better than the objective test of Article 18 in non-contractual situations.").
214.
To be fair, these remain nominal elements of the comparison.
215.
Id. at 330.
216.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Any such test raises the problem of defining which actions
actually demonstrate bad faith or the manifestation thereof. It is
often a qualitative problem rather than a quantitative one, and
lowering the standard of proof does not solve the problem. For
example, when the President of the United States signs a free trade
treaty to reduce tariffs on imported agricultural products, is it bad
faith if Congress, to win bipartisan domestic support for the treaty,
passes a bill granting increased subsidies to American corn growers?
The subsidy will diminish and perhaps eliminate the advantage that
foreign corn growers expected to gain from the treaty. On the other
hand, without the subsidy, two-thirds of the Senate may not approve
the treaty, in which case growers of other foreign crops besides corn
would also fail to receive any of the treaty's benefits. Is the corn
subsidy an example of bad faith, or is it a good faith attempt to build
the domestic support necessary for ratification? Neither the bad faith
nor the manifest intent test can answer that question-at least not
objectively-so states are left with inconclusive debates over whether
the interim obligation has been violated.

E. The Status Quo/FacilitationTest
A workable test for the interim obligation must facilitate treaty
review procedures within states, and it must do so with a clear and
objective standard. None of the tests considered thus far fulfill these
The essential elements test prohibits states from
criteria.
transgressing a treaty's most essential provisions, but the test offers
no method for determining which provisions are the essential ones.
The impossible performance test prohibits states from taking any
action that would render a treaty's subsequent performance
impossible, but the test provides little restraint on states in the
context of multilateral and norm-creating treaties. The bad faith and
manifest intent tests attempt to proscribe the condemnable conduct
that the impossible performance fails to cover, but both tests are
highly subjective and fail to provide a workable standard for defining
bad faith or the manifestation thereof.
The remainder of this Article describes a new test that seeks to
assist domestic treaty review by preserving the status quo at the time
of signature. This new "facilitation test" has two parts. First, has a
signatory state transgressed one or more articles of the pending
treaty? A state "transgresses" a pending treaty when acting contrary
to the obligations the treaty would impose had the treaty already
entered into force. The word "transgressed" is used here instead of
"breached" because the treaty is not yet binding law and thus cannot
be breached in a legal sense. Second, was the transgressing action
new, or was it part of a pattern existing prior to signature? If the
transgressing action is not new, there has been no violation.
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As an illustration, if two states with mutually imposed tariffs of
20% sign a treaty agreeing to lower their tariffs to 10%, it would not
be a violation of Article 18 if one or both states maintained the
existing 20% tariff until ratification. Although the 20% tariff would
transgress the treaty's text, Article 18 would not prohibit this
transgression because it began prior to signature. By contrast, if a
state raised its tariffs above 20%, it would violate Article 18 because
the transgression would be new; it would alter the status quo in a
manner contrary to the treaty.2 17
Importantly, the facilitation test preserves the status quo in only
one direction. Signatory states may not move away from eventual
compliance, but they are permitted to move toward it. Thus, in the
example above, a signatory state would be permitted prior to
ratification to lower its tariff below 20%.
The facilitation test, unlike the essential elements test, does not
try to reduce the inherently abstract concept of object and purpose
into a few specific provisions. The test leaves object and purpose at a
high level of generalization and focuses instead on the word "defeat."
The goals of a treaty are "defeated" when a signatory state acts
contrary to both the text of a new treaty and the state's established
pattern of practice.
Conceptually, the facilitation test accommodates domestic treaty
review by balancing two variables. The first variable measures the
weight of the obligation imposed on a state at the time of signing a
treaty. Ideally, this variable would be as low as possible. That way, a
state would not accrue any significant obligations until the state's
government approves those obligations through whatever legitimizing
process is required by its domestic laws. This variable is important
because it reinforces the principle of consent, and in many states, the
executive alone does not have the power to give consent without
legislative approval.2 18
The second variable measures the degree to which signature
aligns expectations between states. Ideally, this variable will be high
because each signatory state will be capable of a more accurate
accounting of the costs and benefits of a new treaty when it can rely
on other signatories to act in a predictable way and not contrary to
the goals of the treaty. Intuitively, this makes sense; it is harder to
make a decision when faced with greater amounts of uncertainty.
This intuition can be refined through a game theoretical framework.
In game theory, each potential "move" by a "player" creates another

217.
This outcome is consistent with hypothetical (5) posed by the creators of the
Harvard Draft. Supra text accompanying note 189.
218.
See HOLLIS ET AL., supra note 175, at 29-37 (explaining the legislative role
in treaty making).
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fork in a decision tree. 219 When certain moves are forbidden, it
eliminates those forks, making the decision tree-and decision
making itself-less complicated. 220
The difficulty with balancing these two variables is that they are
closely linked but cut in opposite directions. If signature imposes a
minimal obligation on states, it will further the goals of the first
By contrast, if
variable but frustrate the goals of the second.
signature imposes a significant obligation, it furthers the goals of the
second variable but frustrates the goals of the first.
The facilitation test resolves some of this tension. It maximizes
predictable behavior among signatories by requiring all signatories to
maintain the status quo existing at the time of signature, and it
minimizes encroachments on domestic treaty review by tailoring its
burden to fit each state's past behavior. No state is required to take
any action that it has not already been taking. Nor is any state
required to refrain from any action it has not already been refraining
from. Granted, signature still creates a new obligation; a state's
presumptively voluntary pattern of conduct becomes obligatory. The
facilitation test thus seeks to minimize this burden by shaping the
new obligation to fit each state's particular conduct.
In some instances, to balance and resolve these variables, the
facilitation test creates a double standard whereby one state is
permitted to do what another state is forbidden from doing. Such a
double standard raises questions of fairness and reciprocity. For
example, suppose Italy and the United States sign a treaty to end
capital punishment. Under the facilitation test, the United States
could continue using capital punishment even after signature because
the United States has an established pattern of using the death
penalty. 221 Italy, however, has not used capital punishment since the
middle of the twentieth century, 222 and if it suddenly executed one of
its citizens, the execution would violate the test because it would be
contrary to both the treaty's text and Italy's past practice.

219.

For a non-technical introduction to game theory in the context of group

decision making, see HOWARD RAIFFA, NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS: THE SCIENCE AND ART
OF COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 6 (2002) (explaining that "[t]he essence of this

perspective is that although the individual decision entities make their choices
separately of each other, the payoffs they receive are a function of all the players'
choices").
220.
Vienna Convention, supra note 8, art. 18. More accurately, when Article 18
forbids certain actions, it does not eliminate the possibility that states will undertake
those actions. States could, after all, choose to violate Article 18. Id. But to the extent
that Article 18, as a binding norm of international law, alters state behavior, the
probability that a state will act to defeat a treaty's object and purpose is lessened. Id.
221.
ed. 2001).

ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE 62-74 (3d

222.
Id. at 23 (explaining that in Italy, capital punishment "was abolished. in
1947 for all but military offences during wartime" and has not been reinstituted since).
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In this example, the United States would be permitted to do
what Italy is legally prohibited from doing. Is this fair? The answer
depends on one's understanding of the interim obligation. If the
interim obligation were understood as an agreement between states,
then the baseline point of focus would be between those states.
Questions of reciprocity would control, making the double standard
inequitable. However, when the interim obligation is understood
instead as a procedural rule that accommodates domestic treaty
review, the focus is no longer between states as treaty partners. No
partnership yet exists; there is no binding treaty. Instead, the focus
is on treaty-making procedures and each state's actions over time.
From this perspective, the facilitation test imposes the same burden
on each state as measured in relation to that state's past practice.
A procedural view of the interim obligation accords with the
original purpose of Article 18 and of the Vienna Convention as a
whole. Article 18 does not exist to further the underlying goals of any
particular treaty or to encourage ratification. Indeed, for the purpose
of Article 18, it is immaterial whether a state ever ratifies the treaty.
What matters instead is whether each state has an opportunity, prior
to becoming a party to a treaty, to review that treaty in accordance
with established domestic procedures. In addition, the procedural
view better fits the purpose of the Vienna Convention as a whole
because it is an inherently procedural document. 223 Other treaties
create substantive rules-rules that promote free trade, prohibit
genocide, and make peace. The Vienna Convention, by contrast,
creates the procedural ground rules by which those other treaties are
made, and the provisions of the Vienna Convention, including Article
18, should be read in that light.
The facilitation test is extremely flexible. A state may alter the
contours of the interim obligation simply by changing its behavior
before signature, thereby altering the status quo. Such flexibility
further reconciles the two variables which underlie the interim
obligation. First, the flexibility allows each state to control the
details and extent of the burden imposed upon it; second, the presignature change in behavior puts other signatories on notice so that
they know what to expect and can factor the change into their
decisions to sign or ratify.
Indeed, a state need not actually change its behavior so long as
the state announces that a specific aspect of its behavior might
change. A clear announcement is as good as an actual change-

223.
"[The Vienna Convention] is not so concerned with the substance of a treaty
(the rights and obligations created by it)." AUST, supra note 38, at 6. Rather, the
Convention contains "the body of rules which determines whether an instrument is a
treaty, how it is made, brought into force, amended, terminated, and operates
generally." Id.
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perhaps even better. The interim obligation is satisfied so long as
states communicate their intentions clearly enough and early enough
to minimize any disruption to the process.
One potential concern raised by the facilitation test is that it
creates perverse incentives for states to act contrary to their proposed
treaty obligations. Returning to the hypothetical treaty between Italy
and United States, Italy may want to maximize the range of what it
is permitted to do between signature and ratification. To that end,
Italy could use the death penalty prior to signature in order to alter
the status quo and keep open a category of action that otherwise
would have been prohibited post-signature.
If the facilitation test actually induced states to act contrary to
the goals of the proposed treaty, this would be a serious concern.
However, there are good reasons to doubt whether such a threat
exists. First, only in special circumstances will a state have the
desire or incentive to act in a manner that is contrary to both its
established pattern of practice and the goals of a treaty it has signed
and is seeking to ratify. Second, even if the desire existed, the state
would risk alienating other negotiating states and scuttling the
chances of ratification. Lastly, the facilitation test would enable a
state like Italy to shape its post-signature obligations simply by
announcing that it reserves the right to engage in specific conduct
prior to ratification; Italy need not actually execute anyone. Thus,
what the facilitation test actually encourages
is clearer
communication between signatories.
Another concern the facilitation tests raises is that it could
deprive states of gamesmanship opportunities. In a world without
the facilitation test, if two states sign a treaty to lower tariffs on each
other's imports, one state could try to induce the other's speedy
ratification by raising tariffs; in a world with the facilitation test,
however, this move would be prohibited post-signature.
Such
gamesmanship is a good thing insofar as it encourages the
development of international law.
Nevertheless, the facilitation test does provide ample room for
gamesmanship, and to the extent gamesmanship is restricted, it is for
the sake of democratic legitimacy. Prior to signature, the facilitation
test imposes no direct restriction on gamesmanship. 224 In the tariff
hypothetical, a state would be permitted to raise tariffs one day and
sign the treaty the next, and the raised tariffs could remain in place
until ratification. States may also expand the opportunity for postsignature gamesmanship by announcing their intentions in advance

224.
However, the facilitation test does impose an indirect restriction on presignature behavior insofar as pre-signature behavior is one of the two bases for
calculating the scope of a state's post-signature obligations under the test.
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of signature-such as, for example, announcing the right to raise
tariffs if other negotiating states do not ratify within a given time
period. The effect of the facilitation test is simply to create a default
rule that states will forgo a degree of gamesmanship after signature
to aid the legitimizing processes of domestic treaty review.
Furthermore, when applied to the tariff example, the facilitation
test is consistent with the original understanding of the Vienna
Convention's drafters.2 25 The tariff example is example (5) from the
list created by the International Law Commission. 226 The ILC
believed that the interim obligation should prohibit the raising of
tariffs. Other tests, such as the impossible performance test, reach
the opposite conclusion and are thus inconsistent with the drafters'
original understanding.
In sum, Article 18 is a procedural rule that exists to facilitate
domestic treaty review. The facilitation test furthers this goal by
preserving the status quo at the time of signature. At the same time,
the test minimizes the potential burden on signatory states by
shaping the interim obligation to fit each state's existing pattern of
behavior. Under the facilitation test, a signatory state defeats a
treaty's object and purpose when the state acts contrary to both the
text of the treaty and its own past practice. By accommodating
domestic treaty review, the facilitation test reinforces the principle of
consent in international law and recognizes that, for many states, full
consent is only possible after multiple branches of those states'
governments review the treaty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The term "object and purpose" is an inherently abstract concept
that refers broadly to a treaty's goals. Any attempt to formulate a
single, more specific definition is bound to fall short because no single
definition could be adequately specific to guide practitioners through
the multiple contexts in which the term is used. A more fruitful
approach is to understand how the term is used in practice.
This Article analyzed the term object and purpose by focusing on
how it is used in three contexts. First, Vienna Convention Article 31
states that a treaty should be interpreted in light of its object and
purpose. In this context, object and purpose is used to reinforce the
interpretive principle that a treaty's text should be interpreted to
reflect the goals embodied in the document as a whole. Second,

225.
test).
226.

See supra discussion Part V.D (discussing the parameters of the facilitation
Charme, supra note 37, at 99.

20101

THE OBJECTAND PURPOSE OFA TREA TY

609

Article 19(c) prohibits reservations that are incompatible with a
treaty's object and purpose. This test is best understood as a
coherence-saving mechanism, preventing incoherent distinctions from
being incorporated into a treaty's rules and undermining the treaty's
legitimacy. Finally, Article 18 creates an interim obligation that
prohibits conduct that would defeat a treaty's object and purpose.
This prohibition is best understood as a test to preserve the status
quo and thereby facilitate domestic treaty review procedures.
Lawyers who face the term object and purpose in any of these three
contexts may benefit from the analysis presented herein.

